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Naturalism, Fallibilism, and the A Priori
Abstract.  This paper argues that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible
with naturalism– if the a priori is understood in a way that is free of the inessential
properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept.  I argue that
empirical indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a priori; however,
the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted in such a way that we can be
fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a priori
accords with the naturalist’s commitment to scientific methodology in that it
allows for apriori-justified claims to be sensitive to further conceptual
developments and the expansion of evidence.  The fallibilist apriorist allows that
an a priori claim is revisable in only a purely epistemic sense.  This modal claim
is weaker than what is required for a revisability thesis to establish empiricism,
so fallibilist apriorism represents a distinct position.
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1.  Introduction
Naturalism is often thought to entail empiricism.  Indeed, the two positions have
sometimes been taken to be equivalent.   But they are conceptually distinct, and1
I will argue that in absence of further assumptions, the one does not imply the
other.  There are different naturalistic theses that are applicable to different
domains, but in the context of epistemology, both the claim that the natural world
is what exists (metaphysical naturalism) and the commitment to scientific method
as the only legitimate means of attaining knowledge of the natural world
(methodological naturalism) are central to a naturalistic orientation.   Although2
the ontological commitments of naturalism may be taken to be in conflict with a
priori justification because of the latter’s association with a realm of abstract
eternal objects, it is methodological naturalism that poses the most direct
2  Quine (1981, pp. 72 and 21, respectively). 3
  By a “non-trivial” form of a priori justification, I mean an a priori justification that4
cannot be fully explained in terms of analyticity or by stipulative definition. 
  The rejection of a  “first philosophy” is often understood as the denial that philosophy5
is an autonomous discipline, or equivalently in this context, that philosophy is continuous
with science.  Empiricism follows from the continuity thesis if it is combined with  a
strong version of confirmation holism:  the seamlessness of the web of belief ensures that
all claims are justified in the same way, namely via the coherence of the system as a
whole with experience.  (Scientific methods may presuppose a priori elements, so
empiricism doesn’t follow from the continuity thesis alone.)
     The denial that philosophy is an autonomous discipline is a separate and distinct thesis
from the denial that it plays a  foundational role – in the sense of providing infallible or
rationally-irrevisable standards – in inquiry.  For further discussion of this issue, see
Siegel (1995).  If the commitment to scientific method is taken to be sufficient for
methodological naturalism, a naturalist might either reject the foundations thesis while
upholding the autonomy of philosophy or reject strong confirmation holism (or both).
The methodological naturalist would then not be rejecting a priori justification outright,
but only claims of its incorrigibility or infallibility.
challenge to the a priori.  As Quine popularized the view, naturalism is “the
abandonment of the goal of a first philosophy” and “the recognition that it is
within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be
identified and described.”   3
     Empiricism might appear to follow from these methodological commitments
in a few quick steps:  If philosophy does not play a foundational role in inquiry by
establishing a priori standards according to which science is to be evaluated, and
if science – construed broadly as responsible empirical methods of belief
formation and revision –  is the only legitimate means by which we attain
substantive knowledge, then it would appear that no statement could have (non-
trivial) a priori justification conditions.   Scientific method is characterized inter4
alia by the ongoing responsiveness of theory to evidence, and recognizing some
class of claims as immune to empirical evidence – should such evidence ever arise
– would be in conflict with the naturalist’s commitment to scientific method.  5
In this paper I will argue that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible
with both metaphysical and methodological naturalism – if the a priori is
understood in a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have
been associated with the concept.  In Sect. 2, I identify the ways in which
naturalism either is or might appear to be in conflict with a priori justification as
it has traditionally been understood.  I then present a naturalistic  conception of
the a priori in Sect. 3.  I argue that a priori claims are empirically indefeasible;
however, the indefeasibility claim should be interpreted in such a way that we can
be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims.  This fallibilist notion of the a priori
accords with the naturalist’s commitment to scientific methodology in that it
allows for apriori-justified claims to be sensitive to further conceptual
developments and the expansion of evidence.  Fallibilism and fallibilist apriorism
3 Naturalists who, following Quine and Putnam, take us to be committed to the existence6
of numbers (understood as sets) by virtue of the indispensability of mathematics to
science will not object to the admission of abstracta per se, but only an endorsement of
them absent a theoretical mandate.
  See, for example, Burge (1993; 1998), Field (1998; 2000), Goldman (1999) and Rey7
(1998). 
are further discussed in Sect. 4.  Clarifying the fallibilist thesis with respect to a
priori justification is a primary goal of this paper.  
In Sect. 5, I identify some ways in which a suitably-naturalistic notion of the
a priori either might be or has been employed to give naturalistic grounds for a
priori belief.  I do not offer a positive account a priori justification; my remarks
in this section are intended merely to indicate how such an account (or accounts)
might proceed.  I close by considering some potential objections to a naturalistic
understanding of the a priori in Sect. 6.  Of particular concern is the worry that
fallibilist apriorism collapses into a version of Quinean empiricism.  I argue that
if Quine is to be understood as offering an empirical alternative to apriorism, his
revisability claim must be interpreted in a way that is stronger than mere
fallibilism.  Fallibilist apriorism is a thus distinct position.  If one adopts it, one
need not reject the very idea of the a priori in order to be a thoroughgoing
naturalist. 
2.  The Alleged Incompatibility of Naturalism and the A Priori
If naturalism encompasses the commitments of both metaphysical and
methodological naturalism, then the a priori, as it has been traditionally
understood, might be thought to be in conflict with naturalism for the following
reasons: 
I.       The subject matter of the a priori knowledge is Platonic.6
II. Rational intuition, the alleged means by which we have knowledge of
Platonic truths, is mysterious and occult. 
III. Non-trivial a priori claims are necessarily true, where the relevant
notion of necessity is metaphysical. 
IV.  Apriori-justified claims are rationally irrevisable, but scientific
claims are, in principle, subject to revision in light of empirical
evidence. 
A number of contemporary philosophers have argued that the a priori should be
understood along more modest lines whereby the properties identified in I - IV
need not be included in our basic conception of the a priori.   Perhaps the most7
interesting and controversial aspect of these contemporary accounts is their
treatment of a family of related notions: certainty, infallibility, and rational
irrevisability.  Naturalistically-minded philosophers disagree about whether there
is any stable and philosophically-interesting notion of the a priori that can be
isolated from these latter properties.
The term ‘certain’ is used in epistemological contexts in a number of different
ways, and there are several different conceptions of certainty that might be
invoked in characterizing a priori claims as certain.  One widespread use of
4  This notion of certainty is employed by Bertrand Russell in Human Knowledge (1948).8
  A definition of absolute certainty would take something like the following form:9
       There is some associated class of beliefs Z(P) of which P is a member, h CP :
¬(Some member of Z(P) is false).
A criterion for membership in a relevant class Z would then need to be given to identify
a class of absolutely certain beliefs.  See Christopher Hookway’s recent discussion of
fallibilism and the aim of inquiry (Hookway 2007) for discussion of a notion of absolute
certainty that is developed along these general lines.   See Firth (1967) for a taxonomy
and discussion of epistemological uses of ‘certain’, including absolute certainty.
‘certain’ that is not epistemic is the expression of the psychological notion of
confidence:  In the sentence ‘I am certain that he will finish the marathon race’,
‘I am certain that’ is roughly translatable as  ‘I am highly confident that’.  This
psychological  notion of confidence is not what is at issue in debates about
whether a priori claims are  known with certainty.  Another conception of
certainty that can easily be set aside is that of highest degree of warrant or
credibility.   The a priori need not be associated with certainty in this sense, and8
moreover, it is implausible to think that a priori claims have a higher degree of
warrant than claims about  immediate sensory experience such as ‘I am  now
being appeared to redly’ or ‘I am now having a pain sensation’.
An important notion of certainty is that of absolute certainty or absolute
infallibility.   A propositional claim or belief is known with absolute certainty just
in case it is not (genuinely) possible for the claim or belief to be mistaken.  If it
is not possible for the claim or belief that P to be mistaken, then it is not possible
that P is false.  Knowledge with absolute certainty thus entails the truth of its
target claim or the propositional content of its target belief.  Examples of claims
that have been thought to be known with absolute certainty include cogito-type
statements and statements, like those mentioned above, about immediate sensory
experience that are relativized to an individual at a particular time.  If a
propositional claim, statement, or belief is thought to have the property of being
known with absolute certainty, then presumably it has this property in virtue of a
particular feature that it possesses.   Although one might want to make the case9
that an a priori warrant is a feature in virtue of which something is known with
absolute certainty, knowing with absolute certainty is not part of the basic
conception of the a priori.
There is, however, another notion of infallibility – more closely aligned with
rational irrevisability – that might appear to be implicated in the basic a priori/a
posteriori distinction.  This notion pertains to the grounds or evidence that we
have for a claim. If one is fallibilist about knowledge claims, one allows that
(under contextually-relevant conditions) knowledge claims are correctable on
conceptual grounds or upon the expansion of evidence.  If P is thought to be
known infallibly in this sense, we think we know that P will never come to be
legitimately undermined, but we aren’t thereby taking P to be a kind of claim for
which mistake is impossible.  It is the notion of infallibility with respect to
undermining evidence that is central to the question of whether a priori
justification is compatible with naturalism:  if a priori claims are understood to be
empirically indefeasible, then it would appear that we are committed to claiming
that we know that no empirical evidence will ever come to count against them.
5  Gauss’ skepticism regarding the a priori status of the parallel postulate and his10
conception of the possibility of alternative geometries is documented in his
correspondence with Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel and H.C. Schumacher.  The relevant
portions of the correspondence are reprinted in Ewald (1996). 
This would be inconsistent with methodological naturalism because it is decided
in advance what the future evidence could be.
I take infallibility with respect to the correctability of a priori claims to be the
central issue in establishing the compatibility of a priori justification with
naturalism, and I will be articulating and defending a fallibilist notion of the a
priori.  I will argue that fallibilism about a priori justification can be understood
as a special case of fallibilism about knowledge claims.  I will not take up the
question whether the susceptibility of our knowledge claims to modification in
light of future conceptual advancements motivates either a cautionary stance
toward belief or scientific antirealism; instead, I will restrict my discussion to
showing how a priori claims can be coherently understood as fallible.
Given the overthrow of  Euclid’s parallel postulate and the discovery of the
set-theoretic paradoxes, an apriorist has reason to be fallibilist about a priori
claims independently of considerations of naturalism.  A sensible apriorist should
acknowledge that an a priori claim might be vulnerable to further conceptual
developments – unless there are special reasons for thinking otherwise.
One can be fallibilist about an apriori-justified claim in two ways:  one might
allow that we could be mistaken either in thinking that a claim is true or in
thinking that its justification conditions are a priori.  In other words, one can be
fallibilist about both claims that are said to be a priori warranted and the a priori
warrants for the claims.  If a proposition held to be a priori true were to come to
be defeated on empirical grounds, both the proposition and our a priori warrant
for it would be simultaneously overturned.   However, a proposition might also
come to be revised on a priori grounds.  The need to revise naive set theory was
recognized on purely conceptual grounds, and non-Euclidean geometries were
developed prior to the discovery that space was non-Euclidean, so arguably the
grounds for revision of an a priori claim could be purely conceptual.  If an a priori
claim were to be revised on purely conceptual grounds, the revision would not
undermine its a priori status. 
 Likewise, we might come to discover that a proposition held to be true a priori
is, in fact, empirically supported.  In this imagined case, only our a priori
justification, not the proposition itself, would be defeated.  In the 19  Century,th
Carl Frederich Gauss doubted the a priori status of Euclid’s parallel postulate,
understood as a claim about physical space; however, he thought it to be
empirically corroborated.   Had the parallel postulate been upheld on empirical10
grounds, only the warrant for the postulate, not the postulate itself, would have
been undermined.
 One caveat should be mentioned:  although I will be articulating and defending
a fallibilist notion of the a priori, it is important to recognize that a
naturalistically-minded apriorist need not be committed to the fallibility of all a
priori claims.  There may be special reasons for thinking that a given a priori
claim is known infallibly; however, the property of being known infallibly does
not accrue to a claim solely by virtue of it’s a priori status.
I will argue that a suitably-modest and fallibilist notion of the a priori is, in
principle, compatible with metaphysical and methodological naturalism.
6  Burge (1993; 1998).11
Although I won’t argue for it here, it should also be clear from the discussion to
follow that this notion of the a priori would likewise be compatible with
naturalistic epistemologies.
3.  A Modest A Priori
3.1.  The A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction
The a priori/a posteriori distinction is at root an epistemological distinction
that contrasts two different types of justification.  A priori justification may be
characterized as follows:
apj: A priori justification is justification that does not rely upon the
particulars of sensory experience for its justificational force.
The locution ‘justificational force’ is due to Tyler Burge.   It is intended to11
express the way in which a priori justification is typically understood to depend
on experience in a general way, whereby experience may be needed to acquire the
concepts utilized in an a priori claim, but the particulars of experience cannot
constitute the evidence upon which the force of an a priori justification is based.
Although the a priori/a posteriori distinction is typically understood to contrast
two types of justification, the distinction may be extended to contrast weaker
forms of positive epistemic appraisal such as entitlement, reasonableness, or
epistemically-blameless acceptance.  The a priori/a posteriori distinction can arise
for these weaker forms of positive epistemic appraisal as well as for justification.
For example, it is often observed that no non-circular justification of very basic
deductive and inductive inference rules can be given.  If this is right, there is a
prima facie problem for claims to their apriority:  a principle cannot be apriori-
justified if it cannot be justified at all.  Some philosophers have argued that
although we may not have a justification for our basic inference rules, we are
nevertheless entitled to employ them – or at least we are epistemically blameless
in doing so.  If our acceptance of these rules is epistemically responsible
independently of empirical experience (and the rules are empirically indefeasible),
the basis for our acceptance of them should count as a priori even if it is not what
we might regard as a full-fledged justification. 
The a priori is often defined “in the negative” as I have done for several
reasons.  For one thing, there may be multiple forms of a priori justification.
Alleged apriori-justified claims include not only the traditional subject matters of
logic and mathematics, but also basic belief-forming methodologies, conceptual
truths, second-order beliefs about the contents of occurrent first-order thoughts,
Descartes’ cogito, and the testimony of others in absence of reasons against it.  It
is not clear that any single positive characterization of a priori justification would
encompass these diverse claims.  Second, if the notion of the a priori is extended
to weaker forms of positive epistemic appraisal such as entitlement or default
reasonableness, the traditional notion that an a priori justification is “grounded in
reason alone” may be inappropriately internalistic.  Moreover, in those cases
where we do take ourselves to be in possession of a reflective priori warrant, it is
7 A number of philosophers have emphasized the need for a more empirically-12
sophisticated account of experience in order to give a negative characterization of the a
priori.  See Casullo (2003, Ch.6); Goldman (1999); and Rey (1993; 2005).
  In what follows, I am not assuming that propositions have a mode of existence that is13
independent from the expressions we use to introduce them. 
  Cf. Chisholm (1977).  Chisholm seems to suggest that justification is an autonomous14
property that some propositions possess independently of our judgment of them.  
difficult to give a more perspicuous characterization of what it is for a warrant to
be based on reason alone.  
On the other hand, without further clarification of the role of sensory
experience, a form of warrant such as memory that lacks an easily-identifiable
sensory component might count as a priori according to the definition when
intuitively it should not.  While it is generally agreed that a more illuminating
account of the a priori is needed, the prospects for providing such an account may
depend upon  our acquiring a more perspicuous  understanding of the cognitive
and physiological processes involved in experience.   12
Regardless of the difficulties in drawing the a priori/a posteriori distinction,
the empiricist cannot rest content with the charge that the distinction is unclear if
only because she needs a notion of the a priori in order to deny that there is
substantive a priori justification.  And to the extent that we understand what an
empirical justification is, we can contrast it with a non-empirical justification or
a justification that is constituted by the operations of reason (or subdoxastic
reasoning processes) upon previously-acquired concepts.  So while I acknowledge
that the notion of the a priori is in need of further clarification, I take the a priori/a
posteriori distinction to be clear enough to support further refinements to the
concept of the a priori and to sustain serious debate about whether any types of
claims or principles are correctly classified as a priori.
3.2  A Priori Claims
Philosophers have been concerned with both doxastic or personal justification
and with what might be called propositional or impersonal justification.  Doxastic
or personal justification specifies the conditions under which a particular agent S
knows or is justified in believing that P. S may be justified in believing that P at
a particular time and in a particular set of circumstances.  Doxastic justification
is thus individual-relative.  By contrast, propositional or impersonal justification
is not individual-relative:  to say that a proposition is justified is to say that it is
justified independently of whether any particular individual believes it.
Justification at the impersonal level is predicated of propositions, rules, or subject
matters.   An account of justification at the impersonal level will specify the13
evidence or reasons that can be given in support of a claim that is considered
justified.  In keeping with a naturalistic view of epistemology, it is important to
understand the notion of impersonal justification as having its genesis in human
thought: justification is not a property that some propositions possess
independently of our judging them so.   Thus for a naturalistically-minded14
epistemologist, doxastic justification is the more basic notion. I will not be
offering an account of how we move from doxastic justification to justification at
8 As Kripke (1980, p. 35) and others have noted, the claim that a particular proposition15
can be known a priori should not be understood as the claim that it must be known a
priori.  A reasonable apriorist will want to allow that a person could have empirical
evidence for a proposition that can be known a priori.  For example, a child just learning
to count might combine five objects with seven objects, then count them to acquire
evidence that 5 + 7 = 12.  But once the relevant concepts have been acquired, 5 + 7 = 12
could be calculated without the aid of objects.
  Externalist accounts of how we could have a priori justification or knowledge at the16
doxastic level have been advanced by Louise Antony (2004), Alvin Goldman (1999), and
Georges Rey (1998; 2005).  
the impersonal level, but presumably in any given case, it would involve the
evaluation of a claim by some relevant subset of the members of an epistemic
community.
In the discussion to follow, I will be talking about justification at the
impersonal level.  My primary reason for doing so is to evaluate a priori claims
for their consistency with naturalism.  When we say that a particular subject
matter – for example, logic or mathematics – is a priori, we take ourselves to be
fully aware of the subject matter’s alleged a priori status.  Thus, I will be trying
to establish the compatibility of reflective a priori warrant or reflective a priori
knowledge with naturalism.  Possessing reflective warrant at the propositional
level is compatible with rejecting the “KK principle” (which says if S knows that
P, then S knows that she knows that P) at the doxastic level.  There may be
conditions under which S knows that P, is justified in believing that P, or is
entitled to infer in accordance with rule R, but her positive epistemic position vis-
à-vis P or R is unknown to her.  Apriorists and empiricists alike are concerned
with the debate about which propositions or rules, if any, can be believed a priori,
and in particular, which have a priori justification conditions.   While it would15
be of considerable interest to have an account of the conditions under which a
cognitive agent might be justified in believing P or entitled to employ rule R when
she is unaware of her right to do so, such an account would fall short of fully
addressing what I take to be at issue between the apriorist and the empiricist.  
So by focusing on a priori justification at the impersonal or propositional
level, I intend to bypass important questions relating to the internalist or
externalist character of justification and knowledge.  These questions, which
figure so prominently in discussion of doxastic justification and knowledge, are
largely moot when the topic is reflective justification or knowledge.  Thus, I will
be operating with an internalist conception of knowledge and justification, but in
so doing, I do not want to beg important questions at the doxastic level.  If
doxastic justification – or, perhaps more plausibly, doxastic entitlement – can be
properly understood as externalist, one might want to reject a priori justification
at the impersonal level, but allow that we have it at the doxastic level.   16
What makes a given subject matter empirical or a priori?  We classify
something as empirical or a priori based on what we take its ideal justification
conditions to be (ideal in the sense of ignoring individual limitations of
computational capacity).  Presumably, if we claim to have a priori knowledge of
something, the a priori justification in favor of our knowledge claim is sufficient
to underwrite it; additional empirical support is not needed.  Likewise, if a
propositional claim is taken to be known a priori, we would not expect empirical
evidence to count against it.  If we could foresee how a claim could be
9  This is Hartry Field’s formulation (Field 1998) of empirical indefeasibility in his17
discussion of the apriority of logic.
  Alleged counterexamples to modus ponens have been put forth by Adams (1975),18
McGee (1985), and Lycan (1993); and some philosophers have taken the sorites
paradoxes to show that modus ponens is not a strictly valid form of inference.  (Whether
any particular challenge is an empirical challenge is a further question.)  Evaluating these
challenges would inter alia involve interpreting the role of idealization assumptions in
the formalization of deductive rules and settling questions about the topic neutrality of
logic.
undermined by empirical evidence, then we would take its justification conditions
to be empirical, not a priori. 
In light of the foregoing considerations, I take the claim that a proposition or
rule of inference is a priori to include the requirement that it is empirically
indefeasible.  However, the empirical indefeasibility requirement needs to be
stated in a way that will be consistent with fallibilism.  A satisfactory formulation
for these purposes is the following:
Empirical indefeasibility: A proposition (or rule of inference) is empirically
indefeasible just in case no possible combination of observations should count
against it.17
The ‘should’ in the definition requires some comment.  There may be possible
observations that could count against an a priori proposition or rule if we were to
allow for an a priori claim to be sensitive to empirical evidence in inappropriate
ways.  For example, perhaps we could imagine taking a set of observations that
conflicted with the predictions of a test hypothesis to undermine our hypothetico-
deductive method rather than giving us a reason to either reject the hypothesis or
modify at least one of our background assumptions.  But this would obviously be
epistemically irresponsible.  (This is not to claim that the elementary inference
rules implicated in our H-D method such as modus ponens and modus tollens are
unassailable,  but simply to point out that making an a priori inference rule or18
claim answerable to experience in ways that are patently unattractive ought not to
count against its a priori status.)
On the other hand, there are cases for which there is (or has been) genuine
disagreement about whether empirical observations constitute evidence against an
allegedly a priori claim.  The proposal to revise a version of the distributive laws
(in one direction) in light of the paradoxes of quantum mechanics is – or at least
may have been – a case in point.  If the hypothesis that the distributive law doesn’t
hold in the quantum domain were to be regarded as a live hypothesis, whether the
observed paradoxes should be judged to undermine the distributive law would
depend on theoretical considerations such as whether apparent violations of the
distributive law are best explained by faulting the logic and whether adopting a
different logic would solve the problem.  A judgment about the evidential relation
of observation to hypothesis in this case would presumably be resolved in the
same manner as other theoretical scientific disputes.
As a first approximation then, the notion of a priori insofar as it might be used
to classify a particular subject matter that I want to defend is as follows: 
10
  Albert Casullo (2003, Ch.3), distinguishes between two notions of fallibility with19
respect to a priori justification that are sometimes conflated:  a notion of fallibility that
allows for an apriori-justified belief to be false, and a notion of fallibility according to
which a belief is defeasible.  No entailment between a priori justification and truth is
asserted on my modest notion of the a priori, so it is only Casullo’s second sense of
fallibility that needs to be considered.
app: A proposition is a priori iff (1) it can be justifiably believed without
empirical evidence, and (2) it is empirically indefeasible, if so justified.
The definition of an a priori proposition can be extended to a system of rules as
follows:
apr: A rule or system of rules is a priori iff (1) it can be justifiably employed
without empirical evidence, and (2) it is empirically indefeasible, if so
justified.
The extension of the a priori/a posteriori distinction to a system of rules is
important to the question whether scientific methods presuppose a priori elements.
4.  Fallibilism
Although a number of contemporary philosophers have advocated a fallibilist
notion of the a priori, most have not attempted to spell out what fallibilism
amounts to in this context in any detail.    (An exception is Hartry Field (1998;19
2000).  I discuss a challenge that Field poses for interpreting the fallibilist thesis
below.)  A fallibilist about a priori justification thinks that an a priori claim is
empirically indefeasible, but he allows that we don’t know that future conceptual
developments will never come to reveal empirical evidence against it. 
Suppose we think the distributive law p ¸  (q w  r)  (p ¸ q) w (p ¸  r) holds true
and is a priori, but we want to be fallibilist about a priori justification.  If further
advancements in physics that we cannot now anticipate eventually come to
vindicate a version of quantum logic that does without the distributive law in one
direction, we will have been mistaken in thinking this version of the distributive
law is a priori true.  Although we don’t think there are any observations that we
might make that should count against the distributive law, it may simply be a
failure of our imagination to see how empirical evidence should count against it.
The recognition that we might be mistaken in thinking that no empirical evidence
should count against the law does not undermine its (alleged) a priori status:  our
fallibility is not evidence for or against the law; a fortiori, it is not evidence
against the law’s being a priori justified.  The fallibilist merely allows that we
don’t know that an a priori claim will never come to be undermined by future
conceptual developments.  (A ‘conceptual development’ here should be
understood broadly enough to include new discoveries made by more rigorous
applications of existing methods of analysis.  Russell’s discovery of the set
theoretic paradoxes was a conceptual development on this understanding of the
term.)
The fallibilist interpretation of the empirical indefeasibility requirement is
analogous to the way in which we might want to allow that knowledge claims,
generally, may be vulnerable to the expansion of evidence.  Unless we take our
11
 This general understanding of epistemic possibility is found in Peirce, who took20
epistemic possibility to be our most basic employment of the term.  See Peirce’s
Collected Papers, Vol. 6, Section 367, 1901, and Vol. 5, Section 454, 1905.   I am
grateful to Robert Meyers for bringing the relevant passages in Peirce to my attention.
fallibility as a reason to adopt a cautious stance toward our beliefs, allowing for
the defeasibility of knowledge claims should not be taken to undermine the
knowledge that we take ourselves to possess:  what is claimed as known is known
according to ordinary standards for knowledge, our current understanding, and all
of the available evidence.  The defeasibility condition allows that, for all we
know, a knowledge claim might come to be overturned upon further conceptual
developments and the ensuing expansion of evidence.  Analogously, to allow that
the apriority of a claim might be empirically defeasible in light of future
conceptual developments and observations that we might make in light of them
should not undermine its a priori status according to our existing body of
knowledge.
4.1  Pure Epistemic Possibility
A fallibilist interpretation of empirical indefeasibility might appear to have an
air of contradiction about it:  wouldn’t being fallibilist about empirical
indefeasibility undermine the claim that any proposition or rule is genuinely a
priori justified?    If it is possible that empirical evidence could come to count
against an a priori claim, then it might appear that the claim is revisable in light
of experience, and so its justification conditions are not a priori after all.  As Field
(1998) puts the point in his discussion of the apriority of logic: 
if one believes it possible that logic will turn out to be empirically revisable,
one surely must believe it possible that logic will be empirically revised; but
that is to believe logic empirically revisable, and so not a priori (p. 4).
This argument assumes the principle  6 , which Field notes is hard to fault
in the current context.  His diagnosis of why the argument fails is that it turns on
a conflation of two kinds of possibility:  the fallibilist about apriorism allows for
the “purely epistemic” possibility that an a priori claim will come to be
empirically undermined, but this purely epistemic possibility does not entail
logical (or genuine) possibility – which explains why it does not obey the usual
modal axioms.
How should this notion of pure epistemic possibility be understood?  I think
it would be a mistake to think of pure epistemic possibility as a separate and
distinct kind of possibility.  An epistemic possibility is an agent-relative notion
that obtains in virtue of a body of knowledge or evidence available to a cognitive
agent (or community of agents).   A pure epistemic possibility can be defined in20
terms of knowledge operators.  I propose to define the basic notion of a pure
epistemic possibility as follows:  something is possible in a purely epistemic sense
12
 Pure epistemic possibility as I am defining it corresponds to what Tamar Szabó-21
Gendler and John Hawthorne characterize as a permissive notion of epistemic possibility.
By contrast, a strict account of epistemic possibility would entail metaphysical
possibility.  An example of a strict notion of epistemic possibility would be the following:
P is epistemically possible for S just in case P is metaphysically compossible with all that
S knows ( Szabó-Gendler and Hawthorne 2002, pp. 3-4).
  An additional epistemic use of possibility is the notion of evidential neutrality that22
Kripke introduced to express the sense in which  a necessary a posteriori claim could
have turned out to be false. ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ name one and the same object,
so it is not possible that Hesperus  Phosphorus; yet, given the evidence, it could have
turned out that Hesperus and Phosphorus were two distinct objects.  However, this notion
of epistemic possibility does entail a genuine possibility, so it is not pure as defined
above.  See George Bealer (2002, Section 1.3) for a recent discussion of different
epistemic notions of possibility.  For further discussion of Kripke’s notion of epistemic
possibility, see Stephen Yablo (1993: 22-25; 2002).
pure epistemicjust in case it is not known not to be true.  Symbolically,    = ¬K¬. A
pure epistemic possibility thus defined does not entail genuine possibility.21
To say that a proposition is known is shorthand for saying that some person(s)
knows it.  Statements about what is or isn’t known within a community also
invoke social standards of evidence and confirmation.   When we assert , It is j
purely epistemically possible that P ,  this epistemic claim must be understood ask
a claim about what is not known in an epistemic community.  (Again, I will set
aside questions concerning how and under what conditions a proposition becomes
established in an epistemic community.)  For the purposes of discussing the status
of scientific claims or general a priori claims, the epistemic community can be
understood to be everyone (or at least everyone here on earth), although, of
course, it need not be the case that each person in the community be in a position
to assess a given claim.  On the other hand, it would not count against S’s
assertion It is not known that not P   if a hypothetical community that was j k
completely inaccessible to S did, in fact, possess knowledge that not P.  The truth
conditions for pure epistemic possibility (“PEP”) are as follows:
PEP:  S’s assertion It is purely epistemically possible that P  made at t is true j k
iff, at t, [¬P is not known by a contextually-relevant subset of members of an
epistemic community that is, in principle, accessible to S].
Pure epistemic possibility as defined above encompasses two established
epistemic uses of ‘possibility.’   The first is the expression of ignorance with22
respect to P for cases where we don’t have adequate grounds for either accepting
or rejecting P.  Goldbach’s conjecture is epistemically possible in this sense:  we
can’t yet say whether it is true or false.  The second notion, and the one with
which I am ultimately concerned, is the epistemic possibility that characterizes
fallibilism about knowledge claims:  although we think we know P, we allow for
the purely epistemic possibility that we are mistaken about P because we are
imperfect cognitive agents.
Fallibilist apriorism is a claim about what is not known with certainty about
a genuine possibility, viz. the possibility that an apriori-justified claim will come
to be revised on empirical grounds.  The notion of genuine possibility here need
not be understood as “metaphysical possibility,” which, as I indicated in Section
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  The epistemic analysis for the possibility expressed by sentences in the indicative23
mood is defended by DeRose (1991; 1998), Hacking (1967; 1975), G.E. Moore (1962),
and Teller (1972).  The authors differ in the details.  Hacking also identifies a sense in
which possibility is epistemic in subjunctive cases:  It is logically and perhaps causally
possible that I should have been blind by now, but it is not possible that I am blind now,
though it is possible that I shall be blind tomorrow.  ‘It is possible that I shall be blind
tomorrow’ expresses my state of not knowing that I will not be blind tomorrow, but in
order for me to have said something true, it must also be genuinely possible for me to be
blind tomorrow. 
  Hacking proposes (but later retracts) an analysis of epistemic possibility according to24
which a state of affairs is possible if it is not known not to obtain, and no practicable
investigations would establish that it does not obtain.  Other proposals, e.g. DeRose
(1991), appeal to what can be known to solve this problem.  I am skeptical, however, that
an account can be given that, when pressured, doesn’t invoke a truth-theoretic notion of
possibility.
III, might be objectionable to a naturalist.  If the notion of metaphysical possibility
is objectionable, an alternative would be to understand possibility as logical
possibility plus a demand for consistency with a contextually-relevant condition
such as a physical law, an accepted theory, or a socially-instituted practice.  So,
for example, it would be possible for meteor on a set path to collide with the earth
iff it is physically possible.  It is possible that Goldbach’s conjecture is true iff its
being true is consistent with mathematical theory.  It is possible that a prisoner on
death row will be granted a stay of execution on appeal iff the reasons for his
request merit serious consideration under the prevailing laws.  There may be
disagreement over which conditions are in play with respect to the evaluation of
a particular possibility claim, but a notion of possibility that is not merely formal
need not be understood as metaphysical possibility.
In the discussion to follow, I operate on the assumption that there could be
statements that are true but not knowable by us.  However, to the extent that the
relevant distinctions between epistemic and genuine possibilities could be drawn
within a verificationist framework, one should be able to articulate the fallibilist
thesis that I develop below within that framework.  (I do not attempt to do this
here.)
4.2   Pure Epistemic Possibility vs. Epistemic Analyses of Possibility
Pure epistemic possibility as I am defining it should also be distinguished from
the epistemic sense of possibility that has been advocated by some philosophers
as the correct analysis of the possibility expressed in sentences of the form It is j
possible that P  , where the embedded P is in the indicative mood.   Thesek 23
epistemic accounts of possibility attempt to state truth conditions for S’s assertion
It is possible that P  in terms of what S does not know and what is or is notj k
knowable.  Epistemic possibility in this sense entails genuine possibility.  The
challenge for a fully epistemic account of possibility is to give an account of
possibility that is extensionally correct without relying upon non-epistemic
notions.24
An epistemic account of possibility that entails genuine possibility cannot
have the truth conditions for PEP given above because something can fail to be
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  Strictly speaking, the use of a pure epistemic possibility operator requires reference to25
one or more knowers.  When S asserts It is not known not to be the case that P  , S assertsj k
that no contextually-relevant subset of members of his epistemic community, where the
contextually-relevant subset may include S, knows that not P at the time of his assertion.
Where ‘'’ is an epistemic community for S, S asserts a statement of the form ¬(x)[(x
0 ') & Kx(¬p)].  For ease of exposition, I will be suppressing reference to both the
asserters and the knowers, except when it is important to identify them.
(genuinely) possible, despite the fact that no one knows it is false.  Ian Hacking
(1967) illustrates the problem with his Salvage Ship Case:
Imagine a salvage crew searching for a ship that sank a long time ago.  The
mate of the salvage ship works from an old log, makes some mistakes in his
calculations, and concludes that the wreck may be in a certain bay.  It is
possible, he says, that the hulk is in these waters.  No one knows anything to
the contrary.  But in fact, as it turns out later, it simply was not possible for the
vessel to be in that bay; more careful examination of the log shows that the
boat must have gone down at least thirty miles further south.  The mate said
something false when he said, “It is possible that we shall find the treasure
here,” but the falsehood did not arise from what anyone actually knew at the
time (p. 148).
While the mate’s statement “It is possible that we shall find the treasure here” was
false, it would not have been false to say that it was purely epistemically possible
for the mate that the treasure was in the bay.  It was not known to the mate and
others that the ship could not have been in the bay, yet it could not have been; it
was purely epistemically possible – possible for all the mate knew – but not
actually possible.
4.3  Fallibilism and a Fallibilist A Priori
A fallibilist apriorist thinks an a priori claim is empirically indefeasible, but
he allows that in a certain purely epistemic sense, it is possible that an a priori
claim will turn out to be empirically defeasible after all.  When the fallibilist
asserts ‘It is (purely epistemically) possible that an a priori claim will turn out to
be empirically defeasible’, he asserts the proposition that is generated by the
pure-epistemic apjapplication of the propositional operator   to the proposition  that P
pure-epistemic apjwill turn out to be empirically defeasible.  Symbolically,   [P  will turn
pure-epistemic genuine apjout to be empirically defeasible].  Or equivalently,    [P  will
come to be empirically defeated].  In what follows, I will drop the subscript
‘genuine’ for genuine possibility.
pure-epistemicIf ‘ ’ is analyzed as ‘¬K¬’ , which in the current context can be read
as ‘it is not known not to be the case that’,  then it might appear that fallibilist25
apriorism could be represented as
apj(1)  ¬K¬[P  will come to be empirically defeated].
apj Because ¬K¬ does not imply , the actual empirical defeasibility of P  does
not follow from the fallibilist thesis.
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  This difficulty is explored in Lehrer and Kim (1990).26
However, (1) does not adequately express fallibilist apriorism:  in asserting
apj(1), we assert that we don’t know what we take ourselves to know, namely that P
is empirically indefeasible, and so it is not the case that it is genuinely possible
apjthat P  will come to be empirically revised.   In general, if  pure epistemic
possibility is understood without further qualification as ‘it is not known not to be
the case that’, we don’t distinguish fallibilism with respect to P from ignorance
of P. 
I think the purely epistemic notion of possibility can be used to characterize
fallibilist apriorism, but this will need to be done in such a way that captures the
particular circumstances in which the fallibilist allows that an a priori claim might
come to be empirically revised.  I will approach this task by first considering how
fallibilism in general should be understood, then considering the particular case
of fallibilist apriorism.  In what follows, I will not be defining a knowledge
operator within a formal system, nor will I be giving a semantics for ‘know’; I will
be giving an explanation of how the purely epistemic notion of possibility
implicated in the fallibilist thesis should be understood.
Suppose we think we know that P, but we are fallibilist about knowledge
claims; that is, we think it’s a purely epistemic possibility that the claim that P is
defective.  As (1) above revealed, this fallibilist claim cannot be expressed simply
as
(2)  ¬K¬[¬P]  (or equivalently, ¬KP)
because when P is thought to be known, we would simultaneously be asserting KP
and ¬KP.
Statement (2) exhibits a familiar problem for stating the fallibilist thesis:  it is
difficult to give a statement of the position that doesn’t lead directly to
skepticism.   Of course in cases where P is thought to be known, the fallibilist26
wants merely to claim that we can’t dismiss the possibility of P’s coming to be
undermined.  So it might be thought that the fallibilist thesis could be stated as
(3) ¬K¬[¬P]  (or equivalently, ¬K~P)
But (3) sounds like we are uncertain of the modal status of P:  If P is known to be
a contingent claim, it would be both misleading and pointless to assert (3), which
is equivalent to ¬K~P.  On the other hand, if P is a necessary statement, (3)
asserts that we don’t know that it is.  So for cases where P is known to be a
necessary claim, the fallibilist is once again in the position of asserting a
contradiction, this time concerning the necessity of P.  Moreover, (3) doesn’t
express fallibilism with respect to P itself.
The temptation to express fallibilism as a claim about what is not known about
a genuine possibility as in (3) above is due to a failure to recognize that the
possibility implicated in the fallibilist thesis is fully analyzed as a pure epistemic
possibility.  In an attempt to state the fallibilist thesis in a way that doesn’t
contradict the claim that P is known, the thought was that some further possibility
– the genuine possibility that not P – is being expressed in the fallibilist claim.
But the result was an assertion of ignorance with respect to the modal status of P.
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  The mistake in construing fallibilism as a claim about modality is discussed by Susan27
Haack (1979) and Robert Meyers (1988), among others.
 That fallibilism is a second-order claim has been emphasized by Simon Evnine (2001)28
and Jonathan Adler (2002) in their discussions of fallibilist belief.
  The notion of a context of assessment has been introduced recently in connection with29
a form of contextualism, dubbed ‘relativism’, that takes ‘knows’ to be sensitive to a
context of assessment, as opposed to the context of speaker use or the circumstances (e.g.
time) of evaluation of a knowledge claim.  On a relativist theory of knowledge-attributing
The sense in which the fallibilist allows that P might fail to hold cannot be
expressed as a straightforward claim about the modality of P.  27
The key to a correct statement of fallibilism with respect to knowledge claims
at the impersonal level lies in recognizing that it is a second-order claim about the
susceptibility of our beliefs and knowledge claims to error in a specific context of
evaluation.   The fallibilist recognizes that we are imperfect cognitive agents and28
that, therefore, our knowledge claims may be correctable.  (The exception would
be those claims, if any, that are known with absolute certainty because they belong
to class of claims for which it is not genuinely possible that any member of the
class be mistaken.  In what follows, this class of claims should be understood to
be excluded from the discussion.)
For knowledge claims of a general sort that are not relative to an individual at
a particular time, individual computational errors and failures to consider readily-
available alternatives are largely discounted by the vetting process required for the
claim to become accepted by a relevant epistemic community.  So the potential
source of error for an established knowledge claim that the fallibilist wants to
acknowledge is the limitation of our current understanding with respect to its
evaluation.  In so doing, the fallibilist is not expressing doubt about a particular
claim, or class of claims; she is merely acknowledging the relevant way in which
general knowledge claims are not immune to defeasance or modification.
Fallibilism thus understood is a view about our knowledge claims that recognizes
both our limitations as knowers and the dynamism of our corpus of beliefs.  
The fallibilist wants to acknowledge that we don’t know that P will never
come to be legitimately undermined.  To express the fallibilist thesis, instead of
(2) or (3) above, we want something like
(4) ¬K¬[P will come to be legitimately undermined in the future].
As it stands, when P is thought to be known, the assertion of (4) retains an air
of contradiction:  If P is known, then P is true.  But if P is true, then it follows that
P will not come to be legitimately undermined.  So it would appear that the
fallibilist cannot both claim that P is known and that it is not known that P will not
come to be legitimately undermined in the future (or, more colloquially, that we
don’t know that P will never come to be legitimately undermined).
However, different standards for knowledge are in play when the fallibilist
asserts It is known that P and We don’t know that P will never come to bej k j
legitimately undermined .  If we knew that P would never come to be legitimatelyk
undermined, we would know P in a context of assessment that takes into
consideration future conceptual advancements and observations that we might
make in light of them.   This context of assessment specifies a higher standard for29
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sentences, the truth of a statement employing an epistemic modal is relative to a context
of evaluation.  Different versions of contextual relativism are defended by John
MacFarlane (2005a; 2005b); Mark Richard (2004); Andy Egan, John Hawthorne, and
Brian Weatherson (2005); and Andy Egan (2007).
knowledge than what is in play for ordinary knowledge claims.  Knowledge of P
according to this higher standard would be infallible knowledge.  When the
fallibilist asserts We know (or don’t know) that P will never come to bej
legitimately undermined , the higher standard is invoked via the assertion. k
Let K*[P] be knowledge in the context of assessment that gives the higher
standards for infallible knowledge of P:   
df (5) K*[P] =  knowledge in a context of assessment for P that has been
expanded to take into consideration future conceptual advancements,
imaginable or otherwise, that we might make, and observations that we might
make in light of those advancements.
A context of assessment is a set of circumstances and standards according to
which P may be epistemically evaluated.  The expanded context of assessment in
(5) is a qualitative change to a context of assessment that raises the standards for
knowledge beyond what is required for ordinary knowledge claims.  
An ordinary context of assessment for a claim of a general and theoretical
nature would be determined, for the most part, by the norms of evaluation of those
epistemic agents who are in a position to evaluate it.  When S asserts that P is
known, S may be claiming to know P directly in accordance with the appropriate
norms of evaluation for P, or S may be deferring to a group of experts in his
community.  In the latter case, S’s claim to know P is based on testimony, and the
relevant standards of assessment for P are set by the group of experts to whom S
is deferring.  For example, if S claims to know that 2 + 3 = 5, S likely represents
himself as being familiar with elementary arithmetic.  However, if S doesn’t know
much about neurophysiology, but he has heard from reliable sources that visual
processing takes place in the occipital lobe, S defers to the neuroscientists who are
in a position to evaluate the truth or falsity of the claim. 
In asserting fallibilism with respect to P, the fallibilist invokes a higher
standard for knowledge, K*[P], that is independent of any particular scientific
discipline or ordinary context of evaluation.  However, the fallibilist does not
claim knowledge of P when these higher standards are in place: If P were known
according to the higher standards for K*[P], it would not be epistemically possible
for P to come to be justifiably undermined upon further conceptual advancements
because it would be known that P will never come to be so undermined.
Fallibilism with respect to P can be expressed as
(6)  ¬K*¬[¬P]   (or simply ¬K*[P])
The fallibilist is not in the position of asserting a contradiction when she
asserts that P is known, yet it is possible in the purely epistemic sense that P
should come to be undermined by future conceptual developments because, in
effect, she asserts KP but ¬K*[P].  
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  It should be pointed out that an apriorist who wanted to retain rational intuition as a30
source of a priori knowledge could give a naturalistic account of rational intuition itself.
A naturalistic construal of rational insight or intuition might characterize it as a
(noninferental) judgment of evidentiality with no attendant claim about access to an
independent realm of truths.  The term “rational insight” thus might be understood only
as loose talk meant to describe whatever psychological processes are involved in coming
to see an a priori proposition as evident.  Both Bonjour (1998, p. 109) and Goldman
(1999, p. 12) have noted that rational intuition could be naturalized along these lines.
With a general statement of fallibilism in hand, we now have the resources to
state fallibilist apriorism.  Fallibilism with respect to empirical indefeasibility can
be distinguished from ignorance about it using the knowledge operator K*:
apj(7) ¬K*¬[P  is empirically defeasible],
 or equivalently,
apj(7') ¬K*¬[P  will come to be empirically defeated].
The knowledge operator in (7) and (7') specifies a standard for knowledge
according to which we would not claim to know that a claim that we take to be a
priori is not empirically revisable.  The context in which this standard is invoked
is the same as the context in which a fallibilist acknowledges that we don’t know
that an established knowledge claim is defective – namely the context in which
future conceptual advancements and observations that we might make in light of
those advancements are taken into consideration.  Fallibilist apriorism is just a
particular instance of the more general case.
    
5.  The Compatibility of a Modest A Priori with Naturalism
The modest notion of the a priori outlined above is immune to the most of the
objections that I raised in Section 2 on behalf of the naturalist.  There is no
conflict with metaphysical naturalism (and hence attempts to reconcile
epistemology with metaphysical naturalism) because no commitment is made
either to Platonic entities as the subject matter of the a priori or to rational
intuition as the source of a priori justification.  The aspects of a priori justification
that are most objectionable to the methodological naturalist are likewise largely
eliminated on a fallibilist notion of the a priori.  A priori justification need not be
associated with any particular view about metaphysical necessity.  Nor are the
properties of absolute certainty, rational irrevisability, or infallibility attributed to
a priori claims.  A fallibilist apriorism allows for the defeasibility of an apriori-
justified claim in the same way that knowledge claims, generally, may be
understood to be defeasible.  Thus objections I – IV in Section 2 do not apply to
a suitably-modest notion of the a priori.
However, if rational intuition is rejected, one might wonder what other a priori
account is on offer.    I will not attempt here to give a naturalistic account of a30
priori justification – either for belief or for rules of inference, but I will identify
some recent approaches to providing the desired naturalistic grounds.  My own
view is that it is highly unlikely that there will be a single, unified naturalistic
account of a priori.  My reasons for thinking this are as follows:  First, as I noted
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in Section 3, the range of different kinds of beliefs, inference rules, or claims that
we might classify as a priori may not admit of a single positive characterization.
If so, there may be multiple forms of a priori justification, depending on the target
class.  Second, different standards apply to different forms of positive epistemic
appraisal: the conditions that must be met for entitlement or epistemically-
blameless reasoning are weaker than what must be met for justification sufficient
for knowledge, and furthermore, there is disagreement with respect to what the
standards for knowledge must be (although a naturalist will likely deny that they
are the standards of the skeptic).  One would expect a priori standards to vary
concomitantly.  Finally, the term ‘justification’ may be used to encompass a
plurality of epistemic values, each of which may have different satisfaction
conditions, and no one of which is equivalent to justification itself.  For example,
judgments with respect to the utility of a belief-forming process or method need
not invoke an access condition that must be met by an epistemic agent, whereas
a judgment that a belief is formed in a responsible manner will require that the
agent be guided, in at least some sense, by appropriate considerations.  If this is
right, which concerns are being addressed will determine what conditions have to
be met for justification.
  Although it might be argued that some conceptual truths are analytic, it is
generally conceded that other a priori subject matters, for example logic, can’t be
explained in terms of analyticity.  A number of different explanations of how logic
could be apriori-justified that don’t appeal to rational intuition have been
advanced by contemporary philosophers:  Paul Boghossian (2000; 2001; 2003)
and Christopher Peacocke (1993;1998) have advocated meaning-based strategies,
according to which the meaning-constituting roles of logical principles assure
their validity; Boghossian also argues for a rule-circular justification for logic, as
does Michael Dummett (1973).  
Some philosophers have argued more broadly for a naturalistic account of a
priori justification or knowledge:  Louise Antony (2004), Alvin Goldman (1999),
and Georges Rey (1998) defend a reliabilist account, according to which some
reliable cognitive processes could be a priori warranters.  Stephen Schiffer
(unpub. ms.) identifies a way in which we could be non-inferentially justified in
believing certain necessary truths based on how we are built as information
processors.  Hartry Field (1998; 2000) argues that basic belief-forming
methodologies are default reasonable but empirically indefeasible, where these
attributes are evaluative judgments that we make.  One popular line of
argumentation  locates the source  of entitlement or justification for basic
inference rules in our need to presuppose them in reasoning.  This approach is
developed in different ways by Ernest Nagel (1956), Thomas Nagel (1997) and
Crispin Wright (2004), among others.  Questions may be raised about the
adequacy of these various accounts, but they are naturalistic alternatives to the
traditional appeal to rational insight.
6.   The Philosophical Role of a Naturalistic A Priori
In this final section, I consider some objections to a naturalistic conception of
the a priori.  For one thing, it might be thought that the naturalistic notion of the
a priori that I have defended here is of little interest.  The features of the a priori
that rendered it suitable for a foundationalist account of knowledge – certainty,
rational irrevisability, and the link with necessary truth – have either been rejected
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  Establishing the claim that a priori and necessary propositions are coextensive may be31
a challenge: while it is widely recognized that there are contingently true a priori
statements that acquire their a priori status in virtue of choices we make about fixing the
references of our terms, Tim Williamson (1986) and John Hawthorne (2002) have
argued, respectively, that there either are or may be deeply contingent a priori statements
for which there is no semantic guarantee that some verifying state of affairs actually
exists.
or deemed inessential to the basic concept.  However, empirical indefeasibility,
albeit on a fallibilist interpretation, has been retained.  So if there are claims,
rules, or principles that have such a priori justification conditions, this is of
considerable interest and epistemological importance.  Moreover, adopting a
naturalistic conception of the  a priori leaves open the possibility that there may
be a close connection between a priori justification and necessary truth: 
naturalistic apriorism need only deny that any apriori-justified proposition is
thereby metaphysically necessary.  But a naturalist can allow that the a priori may
be intimately linked with necessary truth on some reasonably-naturalistic
understanding of modal notions.   31
A second worry is that any naturalistic form of a priori justification would
have to be psychologistic and that, therefore, it would fail to establish the
objectivity of a  target claim.  For example, if claims are allegedly justified by
their self-evidence or the inconceivability of  their falsehood, the worry is that
their verisimilitude does not guarantee their truth (or in the case of inference rules,
their seeming to be reliable doesn’t guarantee their actual reliability).  However,
reliabilist accounts of a priori knowledge are paradigmatically naturalistic, and
although they are psychologistic in the sense that they locate warrant within the
psychological processes and methods that generate belief, if correct, they cannot
be faulted for failing to establish the objectivity of their target beliefs:  a belief is
apriori-justified on a reliabilist account of justification just in case it is solely the
result of a process that is, in fact, reliable and is indifferent to the particulars of
experiential input.  On a more internalistic account of justification, objectivity
might be secured by an appeal to the overall coherence of a priori claims within
a system of beliefs.  It is open to the apriorist as well as to the empiricist to argue
for the objectivity of traditionally a priori subject matters – such as mathematics
and logic – by virtue of their instrumentality to the acquisition of knowledge
generally, including their role in establishing scientific claims.  Logic and
mathematics are instrumental to science, so they “share in the success of science”;
however, logic and mathematics are not empirical if they are presupposed rather
than tested by scientific methods. 
This brings me to a third worry, which is that fallibilist apriorism is
indistinguishable from Quinean empiricism.  It should be clear from what has
been said that this is not the case.  However, the point merits some further
discussion because it is not as widely appreciated as it should be that fallibilism
about the a priori is not equivalent to empiricism.  Fallibilism allows that we don’t
know that a claim (or a warrant for a claim) will not come to be subsequently
overturned on empirical grounds when future conceptual advancements and
observations we might make in light of them are taken into consideration.  But
acknowledging this purely epistemic possibility does not tell us what basis we
have for accepting the claim to begin with or what its justification conditions are.
By contrast, Quine’s revisability thesis is intended to show that no statement has
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  This general point is emphasized by both Hartry Field (1998; 2000) and Georges Rey32
(1993; 2005).  Alternatively, if one were to accept Quine’s extreme version of
confirmation holism advanced in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” all claims would
automatically have empirical justification conditions because the web is seamless and the
system as a whole is the unit of confirmation.  But this extreme version of confirmation
holism is implausible, and Quine himself rejects it in Word and Object (1960, p. 13, fn).
  A nonclassical logic might be developed for the purpose of modeling an area of33
discourse that is not immediately and directly amenable to representation in classical
logic, either because some class of statements violates an initial idealization assumption
of classical logic or because an apparent violation of a logical principle is discovered
within a particular subject matter.  Free logics, logics of vagueness, and intuitionist logics
for mathematics would be examples of the former, and quantum logics would be
examples of the latter.  Whether a “special-purpose” logic should count as a revision to
our logic may depend on whether it also is being advanced as a general-purpose logic.
the status of being a priori.    In order to do this, the revisability claim must be32
interpreted in a way that is stronger than mere fallibilism.
Quine’s revisability claim must be understood as the claim that it is genuinely
– not just purely epistemically – possible that P should be revised in light of
experience.  But this means that there are possible observations we could make
such that if we did make them, revisions to an allegedly apriori-justified claim, for
example a logical principle, would be rationally mandated or at least rational to
accept.  On the Quinean picture, a revision would be rational if making the
revision would maximize simplicity and conservativeness in our overall system
of belief.  So Quine would appear to be committed to the following:
REV:   For any given logical principle L (where logical principles should be
understood to include valid rules of inference), there are possible observations
we could make such that a revision to L would best preserve simplicity and
conservativeness in our system of beliefs.
There are challenges to upholding REV.  For one thing, REV requires that there
be possible observations that would justifiably undermine L.  It is hard to think of
convincing cases of empirical observations that should count as evidence against
elementary principles such as the law of identity or modus ponens.  However,
given the peculiarities of quantum mechanics, perhaps there are such possible
observations.  I think the harder problem to address is the claim that a revision to
any given logical principle L would best preserve simplicity and conservativeness
for some, but not all, possible observations that we might make.  (If a revision
would best preserve simplicity and conservativeness for any possible observations
that we might make, then it would do so independently of the evidence, in which
case the revision would not be made on empirical grounds.)
A revision of a logical principle involves more than just the abrogation of a
particular principle in a particular domain of discourse; a revision requires the
adoption of an alternative logic that does without the impugned principle.
Consider once again the proposal to revise the distributive law.  A quantum logic
that does without the distributive law might be developed as a “special-purpose”
logic to model the behavior of subatomic particles, but if this quantum logic is
adopted as a revision to our general-purpose logic, the distributive law will no
longer have the status of a logical principle.   Presumably we would still want to33
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use the distributive laws when reasoning about macroscopic phenomena, so
conditions under which the law could be employed would need to be specified.
The proposed quantum logic would have to be such that the resultant gain in
simplicity and conservativeness of adopting the new logic more than offset the
concomitant loss of the distributive law as a logical principle.  Perhaps the
quantum logic would be judged to meet this goal.  But the claim of REV is that
for each logical principle L, there is a revision in light of possible observations
we might make such that the revision would best preserve the dual goals of
simplicity and conservativeness in the system.  This is a very strong claim, and it
is not one for which the vague picture of the web of belief offers any support.
7.  Concluding Remarks 
Debates about a priori justification are often characterized as debates between
the apriorist and the naturalist.  I hope to have shown that this is a mistake.  A
suitably-modest and fallibilist notion of a priori justification is, in principle,
compatible with naturalism – unless naturalism is partially defined as the rejection
of a priori knowledge.  However, if the a priori is divested of properties that are
extraneous to the basic a priori/a posteriori distinction, the motivation to equate
naturalism with empiricism is largely eliminated.  One can allow that there may
be a priori forms of justification, yet be a thorough-going naturalist.  The
interesting question is whether any beliefs, claims, or rules have a priori
justification conditions, and if so, what form that justification would take.
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